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Contributory Negligence in Product Liability
S. Burns Weston*
EFENDANTS ARE JUST THAT. They choose not their opponents.
Usually the law makes them an underdog. Psychologically,
they are frequently the underdog.
When a jury issue is presented in products cases, contribu-
tory negligence and assumption of risk often become vital. More-
over the courts and legislatures more often than not have
whittled away the defenses and in some instances anesthetized
them so that plaintiffs have acquired greater latitude in being
able to reach the jury.
For example, in days past defendants in products cases re-
lied heavily on the concept of privity, whether the action sounded
in negligence or implied or express warranty. However, privity
is being whittled away by statute' and by case law.2 Ohio has
repudiated privity in express warranty cases where reliance on
advertising is alleged.3 Michigan discarded it in implied warranty
cases.4 Wisconsin abandoned it in negligence cases, even though
the product is not "inherently dangerous." In addition, there are
a myriad of decisions which have followed and expanded upon
the MacPherson case in holding that privity is not required where
the product is not "imminently" dangerous.5
This article does not purport to be exhaustive. It does ex-
plore the extent to which classical defenses of contributory neg-
ligence, assumption of risk and their relative, "misuse of prod-
uct," are available. Caveat: By the time this printer's ink is dry
some of these applications may be available no longer.
* A.B., Antioch College; studies at the Sorbonne (Paris); LL.B., Yale Univ.
Law School; Fellow, American College of Trial Lawyers; Member, Inter-
national Assn. of Insurance Counsel; Partner in the law firm of Johnson,
Weston, Blackmore, Cory & Hurd, of Cleveland, etc. [The author gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of Miss Mary E. Phillips of the firm; A.B.,
Smith College; LL.B., Western Reserve Univ.]
1 Uniform Commercial Code, Sec. 2-318; Ohio Rev. Code Sec. 1302.31.
2 Rogers vs. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N. E. 2d 612
(1958).
3 Spence vs. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120,
90 N. W. 2d 873 (1958), as clarified in Manzoni vs. Detroit Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co., 363 Mich. 235, 109 N. W. 2d 918 (1962).
4 Smith vs. Atco Company, 6 Wis. 2d 371, 94 N. W. 2d 697 (1959).
5 MacPherson vs. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
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Pure Negligence Situations
Contributory negligence generally is recognized as a defense
in products negligence cases. In a leading airplane case where
negligent design was claimed, the Federal Court of Appeals dis-
allowed the use of contributory negligence because of lack of evi-
dence that plaintiff's inspection of defendant's product revealed
the defect or increased the risk of harm.
On the other hand, plaintiff's failure to follow instructions
provided by the manufacturer may constitute contributory neg-
ligence.7
Where it is claimed that a specific safety statute has been
violated by a defendant, some courts hold that contributory neg-
ligence is available as a defense and some hold to the contrary.
In Ohio, where a violation of the Pure Food Act 8 is negligence per
se, the courts have recognized contributory negligence as a de-
fense. Example: Whether the buyer cooked sausage sufficiently; 9
or as in Minnesota where the plaintiff poured kerosene on a
fire, causing an explosion and the kerosene contained gasoline
contrary to statute.10 A Georgia court has taken a similar posi-
tion.'1 In these instances the courts took the position that the
statute was enacted for the protection of the "general public."
On the other hand, where the statute prohibited sale of guns
to minors and the minor shot himself, a Florida court held that
this statute was to protect a certain group of persons who were
unable to protect themselves and contributory negligence was
not allowed. 12 Thus, it appears that if a court feels the plaintiff is
one who cannot protect himself, contributory negligence is not
allowed. However, if the plaintiff is regarded as one capable of
knowing the dangers of using the product, contributory negli-
gence is available in an action based on alleged violation of a
specific safety statute.
6 Northwest Airlines, Inc. vs. Glenn L. Martin Company, 224 F. 2d 120
(6th Cir., 1955).
7 Young vs. Aeroil Products Company, Inc., 248 F. 2d 185 (9th Cir., 1957).
8 Ohio Revised Code, Sec. 3715.52.
9 The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. vs. Hughes, 131 Ohio St. 501, 3 N. E.
2d 415 (1936).
10 Dart vs. Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526, 27 N. W. 2d 555 (1947).
11 Allen vs. Gornto, 100 Ga. App. 744, 112 S. E. 2d 368 (1959).
12 Taniami Gun Shop vs. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421 (Supreme Court of Florida,
1959).
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Assumption of Risk
Generally speaking, assumption of risk is recognized in prod-
ucts actions based on negligence. By implication it is available
in Ohio. 13 The Northwest Airlines case 14 explored application of
the principle. Defendant contended that any defect in an airplane
wing would be open and obvious to a competent engineer. How-
ever, the Federal Court of Appeals held that the evidence failed
to establish that the danger lurking in the wing joint was so ob-
vious to the Northwest representatives that they must be taken to
have appreciated the danger. On the other hand, where a garage
failed to repair brakes properly and plaintiff drove the car 150
miles knowing that the brakes pulled or grabbed, the court held
that the danger was so obvious that plaintiff "voluntarily took a
chance that serious injury would likely occur." 15 However,
where a specific statute placed certain duties on a dealer in re-
gard to releasing a car with defective brakes, a California court
has inferred that assumption of risk may not be charged.16
Occasionally assumption of risk may bar recovery as a matter
of law and a plaintiff, with previous experience with and full
knowledge of a defect, may have no redress. 17
Misuse of Product
The term "misuse of product" has crept into court language.
Sometimes it is equated with contributory negligence.' 8 Strange
as it may seem, in some instances the burden has been placed
upon the plaintiff to show that he did not misuse or mishandle
the product,19 or that he complied substantially with defendant's
instructions as to use.2 0 Lucky is the defense lawyer who has
the court and the facts to support this position. In some cases it
has been held to be no defense: 21 while the danger from misuse
1 Patterson vs. Gershow's Super Markets, Inc., 109 Ohio App. 1, 163 N. E.
2d 410 (1959).
14 Northwest Airlines, Inc. vs. Glenn L. Martin Company, supra, n. 6.
15 Robbins vs. Milner Enterprises, Inc., 278 F. 2d 492 (5th Cir., 1960).
16 Gallegos vs. Nash, San Francisco, 137 Cal. App. 2d 14, 289 P. 2d 835 (1955).
17 Gutelius vs. General Electric Co., 37 Cal. App. 2d 455, 99 P. 2d 682 (1940).
18 Heise vs. J. R. Clark Company, 245 Minn. 179, 71 N. W. 2d 818 (1955).
19 Ferrell vs. Sikeston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 320 S. W. 2d 292 (Mo. App.,
1959).
20 Sanders vs. Kalamazoo Tank & Silo Co., 205 Mich. 339, 171 N. W. 523
(1919).
21 DeEugenio vs. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 210 F. 2d 409 (3rd Cir., 1954).
Sept., 1963
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was obvious, there was evidence that defendant's representatives
stood by and seemed to approve the misuse of farm machinery.
Of course, where defendant actually demonstrates the misuse the
defense is not available. 22
Application of the doctrine was not permitted in the absence
of adequate warning by the defendant, where plaintiff used Dreft
detergent in her eyes, causing blindness; 23 nor where the de-
fendant could reasonably anticipate the particular misuse.24
Query: If a defendant can anticipate a particular misuse, is it not
as likely that the plaintiff understands the misuse? If defendants
are charged with using common sense, are plaintiffs excluded?
Apparently so.
One court held that a jury should decide whether plaintiff
was negligent fn altering the extractor slot on a gun; 25 and where
plaintiff ate some coffee containing glass particles it was de-
termined to be a jury issue.26  The court's language is worth
quoting:
While the eating of coffee grounds is, to the minds of this
court, an unusual practice, we will not assume to rule as a
matter of law that such a use of ground coffee is so unusual
or improbable that the coffee manufacturer may disregard it
altogether, and we leave that as an issue of fact in the case,
to be decided by the jury ...
Where a workman used a window frame as a ladder, fell and
was killed the court found misuse as a matter of law.2 7 It was
also held to be misuse as a matter of law where a lady dipped her
hands in Calgonite, although the label contained a warning
against use of it for tasks involving the hands. 2 The court was
not impressed with plaintiff's claim that the defendant should
have spelled out the specific ingredients and should have in-
dicated on the package an antidote.
22 Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company vs. Wichman, 220 F. 2d 426 (8th
Cir., 1955).
23 Hardy vs. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 209 F. 2d 124 (5th Cir., 1954).
24 Phillips vs. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.
2d 857 (1951).
25 Webb vs. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 9 Utah 2d 275, 342 P. 2d
1094 (1959).
20 Maddox Coffee Co. vs. Collins, 46 Ga. App. 220, 167 S. E. 306 (1932).
27 McCready vs. United Iron and Steel Company, 272 F. 2d 700 (10th Cir.,
1959).
28 Shaw vs. Calgon, Inc., 35 N. J. Super. 319, 114 A. 2d 278 (1955).
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Implied Warranty
I. Contributory Negligence
In the use of contributory negligence as a defense in implied
warranty cases, the courts are split. Moreover, there appears to
be some uncertainty in their opinions which suggests that effec-
tive persuasion as to applicability of the doctrine is essential. In
Ohio there is dictum that the defense is permissible.2 9 (A grind-
ing wheel disintegrated). In another Ohio case30 the trial court
struck out implied warranty on the ground there was no evi-
dence to support it. The jury was charged on contributory neg-
ligence. The Supreme Court held that implied warranty should
have been left in the case and that contributory negligence was
charged properly without, however, indicating whether it was
referring to the cause of action in warranty or the cause of action
in negligence.
A similar lack of clarity is found in an Illinois case.3 1
A leading decision holding specifically that contributory neg-
ligence is a defense in an implied warranty action is found in
Mississippi, 32 where plaintiff complained of defects in bags sup-
plied by defendant. The case involved property damage only. We
quote from the opinion:
And the law is well settled that a person seeking to recover
damages caused by the breach of implied warranty of mer-
chandise purchased cannot recover damages which are proxi-
mately caused by his own negligence in using the defective
articles. Sutherland on Damages, 4th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 317. A
person seeking to recover damages caused by the purchase
of defective articles to be used by him can only recover such
damages as he could not have avoided by the exercise of
reasonable diligence; and he is required to make reasonable
effort to protect himself from loss.
In Sutherland on Damages, 4th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 317, Sec.
89, it is said that, "where property is sold with a warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose, if it be of such a nature
that its defects can be readily, and in fact are, ascertained,
yet the purchaser persists in using it, whereby losses and ex-
penses are incurred, they come of his own wrong and he can-
29 DiVello vs. Gardner Machine Co., 65 Ohio L. Abs. 58, 102 N. E. 2d 289
(1951).
30 Sicard vs. Kremer, 133 Ohio St. 291, 13 N. E. 2d 250 (1938).
31 Patargias vs. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, Inc., 332 111. App. 117,
74 N. E. 2d 162 (1947).
32 Missouri Bag Co. vs. Chemical Delinting Co., 214 Miss. 13, 58 So. 2d 71
(1952).
Sept., 1963
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not recover damages for them as consequences of the breach
of warranty."
If the buyer's own fault or negligence contributed to the
injury, as by using the goods with knowledge of their de-
fects, he cannot recover consequential damages, since such
damages were under the circumstances not proximately due
to the breach of warranty. Williston on Sales, Rev. Ed.,
Vol. 3, p. 379, Sec. 614b, and cases cited.
Analysis of the above quoted language reveals that the court
discussed not only contributory negligence but, in effect, was
referring also to misuse of product and assumption of risk,
as well as lack of proximate causation, and that all of these
may be proper defenses. To what extent the Mississippi court
would vary its position on a different set of facts is unknown.
In any case, the court's reasoning is so logical that it is difficult to
understand how anyone could disagree with the elemental justice
it expresses.
A New York court stated the issue succinctly 3 when it said:
. ..Although negligence plays no part in a breach of war-
ranty action, contributory negligence may be asserted as a
defense to the breach of warranty action.
Originally implied warranty stemmed from tort. Then some
writers and courts attached it to contract. Today it is used both
ways but with a growing tendency to turn implied warranty
to the tort field. This is probably one explanation for much of the
divergency in the cases.
In Pennsylvania contributory negligence has been held not
applicable in an action based on implied warranty,34 where a king
pin broke on a truck manufactured by defendant. The court said:
The principle applicable to contracts appears thus in the Re-
statement, Contracts, Sec. 336:
(1) Damages are not recoverable for harm that plaintiff
should have foreseen and could have avoided by reasonable
effort without undue risk, expense, or humiliation. Under
the facts in this case the plaintiff cannot be barred in the
application of that principle.
Thus the court's language seems to recognize assumption of risk
or misuse of product as a defense.
Some courts take a particularly dim view of the right to use
33 Parish vs. The Great Altantic & Pacific Tea Co., 177 N. Y. S. 2d 7 (1958).
34 Jarnot vs. Ford Motor Company, 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A. 2d 568 (1959).
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contributory negligence in implied warranty cases involving
deleterious food.3 5
In a Kansas case it was not only held that contributory negli-
gence was not a defense but also that the defendant may not even
introduce evidence of due care in manufacture or that contami-
nation of the food was caused by a third person. A similar posi-
tion was taken by a California court30 involving a defective milk
bottle, as well as where a plaintiff ate a candy bar covered with
worms and webbing.3 7
However, where plaintiff sought recovery for injuries when
her night gown burned, a Federal Court charged the jury on sole
negligence of the plaintiff without commenting specifically upon
contributory negligence.3 s There was evidence that plaintiff had
taken a sleeping pill and dropped a match while lighting a cig-
arette.
In another case plaintiff sued in negligence and implied war-
ranty for burns while wearing a hula skirt which burst into
flames at a party where people were drinking and smoking.3 9
The trial court charged on contributory negligence but confined
it to the negligence portion of the case. The court charged as-
sumption of risk as to both causes of action. The Federal Dis-
trict Court in Hawaii said:
A further ground for the motion was a claim that, as a
matter of law, the plaintiff was guilty of contributory neg-
ligence, and that this should bar recovery. The court ruled
. . . that contributory negligence would not be a defense
to the claim based on implied warranty, although it would
be to the claim based on negligence.
The court now finds that any facts relied upon as con-
stituting contributory negligence are not so clear as that as a
matter of law they must be held to constitute contributory
negligence. Furthermore, the court holds that contributory
negligence, under the generally accepted rule is not a bar to
a suit based on implied warranty. A persuasive argument
was made by defendants' counsel to the effect that, his-
torically, implied warranty originated in tort, that there is
therefore a tendency to eliminate the requirement of privity,
35 Challis vs. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P. 2d 199 (1933); and Simmons vs.
Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Company, 181 Kan. 35, 309 P. 2d 633 (1957).
36 Vassallo vs. Sabatte Land Company, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1963).
37 Kassouf vs. Lee Bros., Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1963).
38 Dallison vs. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 313 F. 2d 343 (10th Cir., 1962).
39 Chapman vs. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. C., Hawaii, 1961), affirmed
304 F. 2d 149 (9th Cir., 1962).
Sept., 1963
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and that the action is now reverting more and more to the
theory of tort rather than that of contract; therefore, it is
contended, contributory negligence ought, by analogy, to be
a defense to the implied warranty claim. It seems to the
court, however, that, the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence, which takes no account of the comparative negli-
gence of the parties, often produces results far from equi-
table, and for that reason is not likely to be adopted by the
Hawaii courts in its full strictness, if at all, as a complete
defense in such cases as this based on breach of implied
warranty, unless the contributory negligence practically
amounts to an assumption of risk.
While the court seems to equate contributory negligence with as-
sumption of risk, technically this is mixing oil and water.
In the hula skirt situation the court indicated that in com-
parative negligence jurisdictions contributory negligence may be
taken into account in mitigation of damages. If contributory neg-
ligence can be used to mitigate damages, why should it be elimi-
nated in determining whether plaintiff is entitled to a recovery?
II. Assumption of Risk
In the hula skirt case 40 we have noted that the court felt
contributory negligence was a defense where it "practically
amounts to the assumption of risk." This certainly is a tacit ap-
proval of assumption of risk in implied warranty cases. However,
in affirming the trial court the Court of Appeals stated:
One may well rely upon a warranty as protection against
aggravation of the consequences of one's own carelessness.
Thus, the import of the District Court and Court of Appeals'
opinions is that where reliance is carried to the point of foolhardi-
ness, it may be regarded as an assumption of risk and, therefore,
a valid defense.
The Michigan Supreme Court also gives implied approval to
the defense of assumption of risk.41
III. Misuse of Product
A hoist built for carrying material was used to carry pas-
sengers.4 2 The Illinois court stated that if the jury found that use
of the product at the time of the accident was "outside the scope
40 Ibid.
41 Sanders vs. Kalamazoo Tank & Silo Co., supra, n. 35; Kassouf vs. Lee
Bros., Inc., supra, n. 37.
42 Nelson vs. Union Wire Rope Corporation, 39 Ill. App. 2d 73, 187 N. E. 2d
425 (1963).
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol12/iss3/4
12 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
of the use for which it was intended," the jury might then find
no breach of implied warranty.
Connecticut has taken a similar position.43 The court said:
If a buyer has knowledge, either actual or constructive,
that he is allergic to a particular substance and purchases a
product which he knows or reasonably should know con-
tains that substance, he cannot recover damages for breach
of an implied wararnty. Nor can he recover if he suffers
harm by reason of his own improper use of the article war-
ranted.
Thus, as so often occurs, the courts speak not only of as-
sumption of risk but also misuse of a product without making it
clear whether they are talking about these principles interchange-
ably or as separate concepts.
Express Warranty
I. Contributory Negligence
Contributory negligence in express warranty cases is found
less frequently. Defendant advertised that the top of its car was
made with a single sheet of steel when in fact it was not. Plain-
tiff was driving at a high rate of speed. The car turned over and
plaintiff was cut by jagged pieces where the two sections of the
top were welded.44
The Michigan Supreme Court held that there is "no reason or
authority" to support the propriety of a contributory negligence
defense in an action based on breach of express warranty. It
stated further that a manufacturer who makes warranties en-
larges his duty beyond that of ordinary care in manufacture and
may not escape the increased risk caused by such warranty.
In a vigorous dissent one justice stated:
.. .for if plaintiff had been operating his car in a proper
manner, the injuries would not have been sustained.
If in fact an accident would not occur but for the negligent
action of plaintiff or misuse of product, then at least the question
of proximate cause would seem to be a valid issue even though
there is an express warranty. However, Michigan seemingly does
not agree.
43 Crotty vs. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A. 2d 513
(1960).
44 Bahiman vs. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N. W. 309 (1939).
Sept., 1963
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In a Federal Court case stemming from Michigan 45 claiming
an express warranty as to the safety and performance qualities of
defendant's tires, plaintiff received a verdict after having with-
drawn the negligence charge. The trial court, however, granted
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, stating that
negligence was necessary to support a warranty action but once
it was withdrawn from the case then the entire action failed. The
Court of Appeals disagreed and also stated categorically that con-
tributory negligence is not a defense in an express warranty
case; that a breach of express warranty imposes absolute li-
ability and no proof of negligence is necessary. At the same time
the Court of Appeals left the door open as to assumption of risk:
Nor is it shown that the absence of the qualities warranted
was readily discoverable upon examination of the tires by a
normally experienced and prudent person.
A Tennessee court by inference has approved the defense of
contributory negligence in express warranty cases.46 Other
courts have declined to decide the question.47
II. Assumption of Risk and Misuse of Product
We know of no case which holds directly that assumption
of risk applies in express warranty cases, although a more ex-
haustive review of case law might uncover some examples. How-
ever, it seems reasonable that it should apply under a fact situa-
tion where the plaintiff knows something to be dangerous but
proceeds in spite of this knowledge or where the plaintiff's in-
juries are not the result of reliance upon the warranty. Misuse
of product, however, has been held to be a defense where an ex-
press warrant exists. 48 In a case previously mentioned in another
context substantial alteration of a product defeated a cause of
action in express warranty. Moreover, plaintiff's failure to com-
ply with the terms of an express warranty can defeat his action
based upon alleged breach of said warranty. 49
45 Hansen vs. Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, 276 F. 2d 254 (6th Cir.,
1960).
46 Dunn vs. Ralston Purina Company, 38 Tenn. App. 229, 272 S. W. 2d 479
(1954).
47 Young vs. Aeroil Products Company, Inc., 248 F. 2d 185 (9th Cir., 1957).
48 Ibid.
49 London vs. Curlee, 336 S. W. 2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App., 1960).
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The Defense
It is apparent from the foregoing there has been no con-
sistent line of authority as to the use of contributory negligence,
assumption of risk and misuse of product in warranty cases.
There are a few cases wherein it is difficult to determine from the
courts' language which of the various defenses is given approval.
In an action by the estate of a deceased pilot against the
manufacturer and seller of an airplane both negligence and
breach of implied warranty were pleaded.50 The crash occurred
in bad weather and the decedent was not checked out for instru-
ment flying.
The trial court directed a verdict for defendants on the
ground that plaintiff's evidence failed to show a defect in the
plane or that any defect which it had (difficulty of control under
instrument flying conditions) was not explained by defendants in
their literature. The trial court said plaintiff's warranty action
failed for lack of evidence that the plane was not reasonably
fit for flying. The Court of Appeals held that decedent assumed
the risk of flying in marginal weather and was contributorily
negligent in failing to heed warnings with reference to unquali-
fied pilots in instrument weather.
It is not clear from the decision whether the court was ap-
plying contributory negligence and assumption of risk to both
causes of action. For example: As to the action by the co-plain-
tiff, the corporation which owned the plane, the court held that
the corporation could not recover for breach of warranty of mer-
chantability since there was no evidence that the plane was not
reasonably fit for flying and since "it is clear that if the damage
to the plane was proximately caused by the negligence of Choice's
pilot, Choice cannot recover."
Query: Does it not mean that contributory negligence is a
defense in a warranty action? Does it mean that the sole proxi-
mate cause of the accident was decedent's negligence? Or does it
really mean that the plane was misused?
In another case plaintiff disregarded instructions with ref-
erence to doing a patch test before using a hair dye.51 She sued
only in implied warranty and the Supreme Court of Massachu-
setts said:
50 Prashker vs. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 258 F. 2d 602 (3rd Cir., 1958).
51 Taylor vs. Jacobsen, 336 Mass. 709, 147 N. E. 2d 770 (1958).
Sept., 1963
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She has not shown that she was within the scope of any
implied warranty...
Query: Did the Massachusetts court mean she committed
contributory negligence? Did she assume the risk? Did she mis-
use the product? Were her injuries due solely to her own neg-
ligence?
In still another case plaintiff sounded the action in negli-
gence, implied and express warranty.5 2 The manufacturer and
retailer of a hammer were sued for damages for the loss of an
eye when the plaintiff struck one hammer with the head of
another, causing a chip to fly. The court did not differentiate
between the three causes of action in approving the charge on
contributory negligence.
Query: In approving the charge, was the court applying it
to the warranty issues? If the court meant misuse of product was
it being applied to all causes of action?
Conclusion
In a products liability case based on negligence alone we
know of no court that does not allow contributory negligence, as-
sumption of risk or misuse of product as a defense where the
court feels that the facts of a particular case justify it.
Where implied warranty is involved there is little doubt that
assumption of risk and misuse of product will be applied. There
is a split of authority as to the applicability of contributory neg-
ligence.
The majority of text writers look upon contributory negli-
gence in implied warranty cases with disfavor. Since they are
steeped in the history of the law and since the doctrine had its
origin in tort rather than contract, we find no logic that justifies
denial of contributory negligence as a defense in implied war-
ranty cases.
As to express warranty, the defendant has greater difficulty
in finding authority supporting the use of contributory negli-
gence as a defense, even though assumption of risk and misuse of
product have been approved.
In implied and express warranty cases the question of which
defense can be used may be academic. As in so many lawsuits
of all kinds the facts assume vital significance. It is not difficult
52 Odekirk vs. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 F. 2d 441 (7th Cir., 1960).
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to conjure a situation where logic would justify equally the use
of contributory negligence, assumption of risk or misuse of prod-
uct in either an implied or an express warranty situation.
Much depends upon the reasonableness of the defense argu-
ment on the facts and much depends upon the philosophy the
courts are going to pursue in the years ahead. No one can quarrel
with the duty placed upon defendants to exercise ordinary care
or their duty to live up to their implied and express warranties.
By the same token are plaintiffs to be relieved of the responsi-
bility of exercising common sense or the judgment of a reason-
able person? Is an adult who eats candy obviously covered with
worms and webbing entitled to recover on the ground that the
manufacturer breached an implied warranty? Should plaintiffs
be permitted to take refuge from their own stupidity because of
an implied or express warranty?
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